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Abstract 
 
 
The experience of Soviet socialism does not figure prominently in the studies of biopolitics. 
This omission is surprising given the focus on these studies on such extreme manifestations 
of the power over life as mass terror and concentration camps. Yet, aside from casual 
references to Soviet biopolitics in the work of Foucault, Agamben and Esposito, the 
theoretical literature on biopolitics has largely ignored the Soviet experience, while the 
empirical research in Russian Studies has rarely addressed the problematic of biopolitics. 
The article will present the experience of Stalinism as a particularly important case for the 
study of biopolitics, since it helps resolve the problem that has preoccupied scholars from 
Foucault onwards: the proximity of biopolitics to its opposite, whereby it collapses into the 
thanato-politics of the mass production of death. How is it that a mode of power that 
presents itself in terms of care, augmentation and intensification of life so frequently end up 
negating life itself? The paper will address this question in the context of the confluence of 
two political rationalities in the project of Soviet socialism, the revolutionary transcendence 
of the old order and the biopolitical immanentism of the construction of new forms of life. 
Focusing on the catastrophic policies of the Great Break (1928-1932), we shall argue that 
this combination is ultimately aporetic, leading to the violent destruction of the very lives 
that were to be transformed. We conclude with a discussion of the contemporary relevance 
of the lessons from Stalinist biopolitics. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
The application of the Foucauldian theory of biopolitics to the 20th century experience of 
totalitarianism has been curiously one-sided. Foucault’s original thesis about the historical 
shift from the negative and repressive power of the sovereign towards the positive and 
productive power over life has been ceaselessly addressed, restated and corrected in the 
 
context of European fascism and particularly German Nazism.
1
 However, aside from casual 
references to Soviet socialism in the work of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Roberto 
Esposito, the theoretical literature on biopolitics has largely ignored the experience of  
 
Stalinist totalitarianism,2 while the empirical research on this period in Soviet and Russian 
 
Studies has, with very few exceptions, ignored the problematic of biopolitics.3 This omission 
illustrates a wider lack of interest in the phenomenon of Stalinism in contemporary 
philosophy and political theory, which either subsume it along with Nazism under the vague 
rubric of totalitarianism or dismiss it as a modern version of traditional Russian despotism 
that is of little philosophical interest.4 In Western philosophy Stalinism has not been 
subjected to the same kind of critique that, from the Frankfurt School onwards, focused on 
 
Nazism as the obscene underside of Western modernity.5 No such critique has been 
attempted in the Russian academic discourse either, which focused either on setting 
straight the historical record of Stalinist terror or participated in the ideological polemic that 
characterized the destalinization of the Perestroika and the early 1990s. Thus, despite the 
immensely rich historical research produced since the early 1990s, the phenomenon of 
Stalinism appears under-theorized and disconnected from the contemporary debates in 
 
political and social theory.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 Particularly in the case of biopolitics, this disconnection is strongly detrimental since the 
case of Stalinism provides an abundance of empirical examples of the exercise of power 
over life that clearly resonate with problem-space of biopolitics originally charted by 
Foucault. The post-revolutionary project of the ‘construction of socialism’ offers us a myriad 
of examples of radical transformation of every possible aspect of human existence (hygiene, 
sexuality, friendship, legality, dancing, diet, work, etc.), whereby Soviet authorities did not 
merely restrict or repress forms of life but sought to direct, mould and reconstruct them 
along the lines prescribed by or at least consistent with the Marxist-Leninist ideology. While 
the content of this ideology arguably sets the Soviet case apart from the more familiar focus 
of the studies of biopolitics on Western Europe and North America, the drive for the 
positive 
 
reconstitution of forms of life clearly exemplifies the biopolitical turn in governmentality.
7
 
Even more importantly, the experience of Stalinism helps us address what increasingly 
appears to be the central problem, if not an aporia, of the theory of biopolitics, namely the 
relation between its positive and negative aspects, the power of life valorized by Negri and 
the power of death accursed by Agamben. 
 
Is biopolitics positive or negative, productive or destructive? If liberal biopolitics is the 
former and Nazi biopolitics is the latter, what accounts for this difference? Is the 
thanatopolitical conversion of biopolitics due to biological racism (so that Nazism becomes 
thinkable as the negation of the positive-biopolitical tradition of the West) or is it rather a 
necessary supplement of biopolitics that from the outset constitutes its object (bare life) as 
permanently exposed to death? Is the recourse of liberal biopolitics to the negation of life 
an indicator of its hidden proximity to its ‘totalitarian’ antagonist or is the violence of liberal 
biopolitics owing to its own immanent paradoxes? Is a wholly positive biopolitics devoid of  
 
 
any destruction of life at all possible? These and other questions would certainly benefit 
from the consideration of the case of Stalinism, in which the problem of positivity and 
negativity in politics, of bio- and thanatopolitics, arguably reaches its most extreme point. 
As a project of positive transformation of all social life along the lines of the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, Stalinism exemplifies the biopolitical presupposition about the amenability of the 
biological existence of populations to transformation in governmental practices. The well -
known slogans about the constitution of the ‘New Soviet Man’ and the ‘Soviet people’ as a 
new ‘historical community of human beings ’ clearly indicate the positive, literally 
constructive character of the Soviet biopolitical project. At the same time, the actual 
experience of the construction of socialism, from the terrorist drive of the collectivization to 
the anti-Semitic purge initiated by the Doctor’s Plot of 1953 and only interrupted by Stalin’s 
death, has been remarkably destructive, annihilating the very lives that were to be 
transformed into something new. Stalinism thus appears to be a case of an extremely 
productive biopolitics that turned into an equally extreme thanatopolitics. It is precisely its 
extreme and paroxysmal character that makes the case of Stalinism indispensable for 
understanding the potentiality for violence immanent to all biopolitics as well as the limits 
that restrain this potentiality within various constellations of biopolitical government.  
 
In this article we shall take the first step towards this understanding by analyzing Stalinist 
biopolitics as a distinct mode of political problematization of life. Our approach to the 
concept of biopolitics is simultaneously more general and more specific than the focus on 
the empirical techniques of the government of bodies and populations, which is increasingly 
prevalent in the Foucault-inspired histories of Stalinism.8 Empirical studies of socialist 
rationalities of government in such spheres as sexuality and reproduction, hygiene and 
 
 
4 
 public health, labour and crime have tended to subsume the Soviet experience under 
Western biopolitics as a particular case of the more general paradigm of modern state 
 
interventionism alongside such other late-modernizing countries as Turkey, Iran or Mexico.9 
In contrast, the evident differences between the Stalinist USSR and other modern states, 
either democratic or authoritarian, are explained with reference to the communist ideology, 
in which biopolitical techniques were embedded and acquired additional meanings or 
functions. 
 
There is thus a division of labour between ideology, which accounts for the heterogeneity of 
the Soviet Union and other modern states, and biopolitical techniques, which testify to their 
 
underlying similarity.10 Yet, perhaps this perception of similarity, which characterizes the 
‘modernity school’ in Soviet studies, is owing to the overly restrictive understanding of 
biopolitics. If one begins by reducing the object of biopolitics to physical or biological life 
and its domains to medicine and social welfare, then one may safely expect to be able to 
point to the similarities between the Soviet Union and its ideological antagonists: after all, 
there are only so many ways to clean one’s teeth or treat venereal disease, even for a 
Bolshevik. Nor can these similarities be traced to the idea of modernity: there is nothing 
specifically ‘modern’ about the governance of health, reproductive behaviour, physiological 
processes or bodily demeanor, which dates back to ancient history and about which we 
 
have ample evidence from the political thought of the Antiquity.11 The specificity of 
biopolitics cannot simply be defined by its object (the biological aspect of human existence) 
or domain (the medico-social field of intervention). Not every governmental regulation of 
infectious diseases, sexual deviance, hygienic practices or modes of appearances of its 
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 subjects is biopolitical; otherwise, the concept of biopolitics would be so general as to be 
coextensive with human history as such. 
 
At the same time, the restriction of biopolitics to medico-social and other forms of 
population management prematurely narrows down the field of inquiry and obscures the 
generality of Foucault’s original diagnosis about ‘power over life’ in History of Sexuality and 
the Birth of Biopolitics.
12
 As Steven Collier has argued, there remains some confusion about 
 
‘what is designated as bios in biopolitics’.
13
 Foucault’s genealogy of liberalism famously 
highlighted the emergence of the population (or, more generally, society) as a quasi -natural 
reality that possesses its own rationality opaque to governmental practices and hence 
requires a reorientation of government away from the ordering practices prescribed by 
 
‘police science’ doctrines.14 The bio- in biopolitics refers precisely to this quasi-natural 
domain of ‘lived social reality’ and, crucially, refers to this reality in its entirety, without 
singling out anything like a specifically ‘biological’ aspect.15 
 
 
In this logic, the object of biopolitics must be expanded beyond the strictly biological 
understanding of life towards the entirety of human existence and its domain extended 
beyond the medico-social field of intervention, embracing the wider socio-economic terrain. 
What defines the specificity of biopolitics is the specific manner, in which power engages 
 
with life in its various senses and in various domains. Thus, what changes in late 18th century 
Europe according to Foucault is neither the object nor domain of power but the mode of 
problematization, the transformation of its underlying ethos, episteme and techne, in which 
 
life assumes a specific status in the rationalities of government.16 What we shall attempt in 
our inquiry into Stalinist biopolitics is thus neither the application of a ready-made theory of 
biopolitics (of Foucault, Agamben or Negri) to the empirical reality of Stalinism, nor the 
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 empirical study of predefined biopolitical techniques in the Soviet context but rather the 
reconstitution of the Stalinist problematization of life as an object of power. 
 
We shall begin by comparing the governmental rationality of Stalinism with the better 
known biopolitical constellations of liberalism and Nazism and arguing that the specificity of 
Stalinism consists in the combination of governmental immanentism characteristic of all 
biopolitics with the quasi-messianic idea of revolutionary transcendence that seeks to 
abolish old forms of life and create new ones. It is this combination, which is rare and 
exceptional in both liberalism and Nazism, that simultaneously makes Stalinist biopolitics 
most resonant with Foucault’s idea of biopolitics as productive intervention into forms of 
life and leads to its inversion into the thanatopolitical negation of those very lives that were 
to be transformed. We shall demonstrate this inversion in the historical analysis of the 
Stalinist ‘second revolution’, known as the Great Break (1928-1932), arguing that the 
combination of immanence and transcendence in Soviet biopolitics necessarily produces 
more violent and destructive outcomes than the ‘katechontic’, security-oriented biopolitics 
of liberalism. Finally, in the conclusion we return to the comparison of Stalinist and liberal 
biopolitical rationalities, posing the question of what we might learn from Stalinism that 
would remain timely in the contemporary hegemony of liberal biopolitics. 
 
 
 
 
Socialism as a Lived Reality 
 
 
The political project of Stalinism consists in the construction of socialism as a positive order. 
Stalinism may be distinguished from the earlier periods in the history of Bolshevism 
precisely by its emphasis on the productivity of power in social reality. While the early 
 
 
7 
 Leninist period was marked by the successful deployment of communist ideology for the 
overthrow of the Provisional Government and the mobilization of the workers and peasants 
for the defence of the new regime during the Civil War, the shift to the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) in the aftermath of the Civil War entailed that the transition towards 
communism entered what appeared to be a historical pause. Whereas the War Communism 
of 1918-1920 was the first and unsuccessful attempt at the introduction of some elements 
of communism in the conditions of the civil war, the NEP marked a retreat from communist 
transformation as such, leaving Russia and subsequently the USSR in the curious position of 
a capitalist state ruled dictatorially by a communist party. 
 
This is not to say that no attempts to construct new, socialist forms of life were undertaken 
during the 1920s. On the contrary, this period was marked by a flurry of societal 
experimentation with new forms of life, from avant-garde art that sought to go beyond the 
representation of the world towards its actual transformation to worker and student 
communes that sought to embody the ideals of the revolution in concrete forms of common 
 
dwelling.17 Nonetheless, the sheer pluralism of these practices, which frequently 
contradicted or excluded one another, ensured that none of them was able to attain a 
hegemonic status and reorder the Soviet society as a whole in the image of its ideal. 
Moreover, given that most of these experiments focused on cultural transformation, they 
were not applied to the lives of the Soviet subjects immediately and directly but rather 
functioned as forms of mediation that ventured to transform lives by transforming their 
environment, the material and social conditions of its existence. Perhaps, the best 
summation of the logic of utopian experimentation in the 1920s is offered by Lenin’s 
proverbial injunction ‘Learn, learn, learn!’ It is precisely by learning to live differently in 
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 different contexts, from communes to carnivals, learning new routines of time management 
at work or anticipating the communist future by reading utopian science fiction that Soviet 
subjects were expected to transform their very existence, shedding the degraded and 
corrupt forms of capitalist subjectivity and becoming ‘new Soviet persons’. 
 
The Stalinist period, whose beginning is conventionally dated to the defeat of the Right 
Opposition and the formal adoption of the First Five-Year Plan in 1929, breaks with the 
experimental politics of the 1920s in a number of ways. Firstly, as Richard Stites has 
demonstrated, starting from the late 1920s the diverse and relatively autonomous social 
groups engaged in utopian experimentation became increasingly subordinated to the Soviet 
 
government and sometimes violently disbanded and prosecuted.18 Secondly, the pathos of 
utopian transformation characteristic of the 1920s gradually gave way to exhausted 
cynicism and opportunism, the resurgence of anti-egalitarianism and authoritarianism, 
which led to the weakening of both negative (‘iconoclastic’) experiments in arts, education, 
work or sexual life and to the derisive cynicism about the more positive egalitarian 
experiments, from communes to the development of proletarian culture. At the same time, 
these changes did not lead to the abandonment of the task of the transition to socialism but 
in many ways conditioned its intensification: 
 
Stalinism was not simply a negation of utopianism. It was a rejection of 
‘revolutionary’ utopianism in favour of a single utopian vision and plan, drawn 
up at the pinnacle of power and imposed on an entire society without 
allowance for autonomous life experiments.
19 
 
 
Thus, the difference between Stalinism and the ‘revolutionary utopianism’ of the 1920s 
must be formulated in a more nuanced fashion and it is precisely here that the idea of 
 
9 
 biopolitics becomes useful. What makes Stalinism biopolitical is its central question of the 
construction of socialism as a lived reality: how is it possible to transform an 
underdeveloped capitalist country governed by a socialist party into a properly socialist 
society? How is socialism possible at all in the domain of real being as opposed to utopian 
speculation? How does one proceed from reading socialism to actually living it? The 
specificity of Stalinism is then graspable in terms of the overcoming of the ‘ideological’ 
rationality of social change through learning and indoctrination by the properly biopolitical 
rationality that applies itself to the lives of its subjects directly and immediately. In this 
manner, a myriad of experimental attempts at transcendence of the ‘old world’ through 
learning new forms of life gives way to the full forcing of one of these forms of life into the 
immanence of lived reality. 
 
It is well-known that Stalinism was characterized by very few innovations on the level of 
ideology, having freely borrowed various elements from both the ‘leftist’ and the ‘rightist’ 
 
oppositions of the 1920s.20 Moreover, those innovations that could be partially attributed 
to it, most notably the idea of ‘socialism in one country’, certainly did not have mass terror 
as their necessary outcome: on the contrary, in the post-revolutionary context they were 
perceived as moderate and normalizing, a sign of a ‘new maturity’, in the infamously 
 
misguided words of Boris Pasternak.
21
 The true innovation and the true monstrosity of 
Stalinism do not lie in the ideological dimension but rather pertain to the biopolitical 
redeployment of the revolutionary idea of communism as the transcendence of the existent 
order of things in the immanentist terms of a positive order of socialism that is to be 
constructed, ‘construction’ becoming the privileged trope of the official discourse from the 
early 1930s onwards. 
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 In October 1917 the working class defeated capitalism politically, having 
established its political dictatorship. Now the main task consists in the 
unfolding throughout the country of the construction of a new, socialist 
economy and thus finish capitalism off also economically. The socialist 
industrialization of the country – this is the main point from which must begin 
the unfolding of the construction of the socialist economy.22 
 
 
Contrary to both its apologists and its detractors, Stalinism was neither a perversion of the 
utopian idea of communism by a caricaturized evil figure nor the realization of the hitherto 
hidden violent core of this idea. It was rather an effect of the re-deployment of the idea of 
revolution, ipso facto characterized by negativity and transcendence, in the biopolitical 
context, characterized by positive productivity in the immanent social order. The ideal of a 
socialist society was explicitly posited as transcendent in relation to the underdeveloped, 
semi-capitalist, largely agrarian society that the USSR was on the eve of Stalin’s Great Break. 
It is precisely the attempt to force this transcendence within the immanent reality of the 
Soviet society that makes it possible to speak of the period of early Stalinism (1928-1932) as 
 
the Second Revolution.
23
 While the revolution of 1917 was political, establishing the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of the Bolshevik party-state, the Second 
Revolution was manifestly bio-political, translating the political changes into positive 
transformations in all forms of life: ‘The whole cultural system, comprising the organization 
of the state, the ways of running the economy, the social structure, justice, the penal 
system, education, the visual and dramatic arts, literature and the daily life of the people, 
 
was in the throes of rapid change.’24 Forcing revolutionary transcendence within the 
immanence of the social body and thus making socialism no longer something learned but 
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 something lived – this is the biopolitical formula of Stalinism that, as we shall see, accounts 
for its paradoxical and paroxysmal nature. 
 
 
 
 
Securing and Transcending Nature: Liberalism, Nazism and Stalinism 
 
 
It is immediately clear that this Stalinist problematization is entirely at odds with liberal 
biopolitics. In Foucault’s well-known argument, the radical innovation of liberal 
governmentality is its ontological assumption about social reality as characterized by an 
 
immanent logic that is both anterior and exterior to political authority.25 In contrast to the 
preceding governmentalities of raison d’etat and police science that approached social 
reality as transparent and intelligible and hence subject to thoroughgoing governmental  
 
regulation that is in principle unlimited,
26
 liberalism emerged as a critique of 
interventionism, which problematized the assumption of the transparency of socioeconomic 
processes. In the episteme of classical liberalism, these processes are instead posited as  
 
quasi-natural, self-regulating and hence not directly accessible to knowledge by authority.27 
From this agnosticism follows the central tenet of liberal government: the suspicion that 
 
‘one always governs too much’.28 This suspicion brings in both the problematization of 
existing governmental operations as excessively restrictive and regulatory and the 
imperative of involving society itself in the practices of its government. The opaqueness of 
the liberal field of visibility does not prevent active governmental interventions in the 
domain of the social but rather reorients these activities from a self-consciously ordering to 
a securitarian mode. ‘Liberalism fosters the social by conceiving of the government of the  
 
state as securing the processes that constitute a society separate from the state. ’29 The task 
of government is thus no longer to order the realm of transparent representations but 
 
12 
securing what it conceives of as a sui generis reality, ontologically and ethically prior to the 
state. 
 
Evidently, the revolutionary politics of Bolshevism is radically heterogeneous to this 
naturalist-securitarian mode of biopolitical problematization. Insofar as it is animated by the 
quest for the revolutionary transcendence of the existing order of things, socialism is 
opposed both to police science, whose aspirations for total regulation never entailed the 
drive for total transformation, and to classical liberalism, which sought to adapt techniques 
of regulation to the immanent quasi-natural logic of socioeconomic processes. To the extent 
the Bolshevik ideology construed some aspects of the existing Russian reality as ‘natural’, 
this was not the harmonious and self-regulating nature, whose immanent processes the 
government must secure, but rather the corrupted and debased nature that groans for the 
redemption from itself that the quasi-messianic revolutionary movement promises to 
 
attain.
30
 In the words of Maxim Gorky, the founding father of socialist realism, ‘nature is 
acting as our enemy and we must unanimously wage war against it as an enemy’. 
 
In the Union of Soviets, a struggle is taking place of the rationally organized 
will of the labouring masses against the arbitrary forces of nature and against 
the ‘arbitrariness’ in man, which in its essence is nothing more than the 
instinctive anarchism of personality, fed by centuries of pressure on it from a 
class-oriented state.31 
 
 
It is this idea of the transcendence of nature that is central to the socialist project and 
differentiates it not only from liberalism but also from Nazism, providing us with yet another 
refutation of the subsumption of the two regimes under the category of totalitarianism. 
‘Soviet power demonstrated permanently and on different levels of its political and 
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 economic practice a deep, almost instinctive aversion toward everything natural. The 
campaigns against genetics and psychoanalysis are as characteristic in this respect as the 
collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s, aimed at uprooting the peasants and severing  
 
their traditional, intimate attachment to the earth.’32 While Nazism may be defined as a 
biocratic project which sought to subject life to power by subjecting power to the biological  
normativity inherent in life itself, the Bolshevik revolutionary project was originally 
ideocratic, promising to subject and conquer nature, including human nature, by the power 
of ideas. This emphasis on transcendence explains the connection between Bolshevism and 
messianism, which testifies not to the perversion of the scientific spirit of Marxism by 
archaic Russian superstition but to the fidelity of the Russian revolution to the spirit of 
Marxism itself, whose messianic promise has only been fully illuminated in the political  
 
philosophy of the late 20
th
 century.
33 
 
 
This ideocratic orientation of Bolshevism underwent an important transformation in the 
aftermath of the Civil War. As the messianic anticipation of world revolution dwindled after 
the end of World War I, the question arose of how a solitary revolutionary state may sustain 
itself in the hostile environment. Should the USSR pause and adapt to the capitalis t world 
system (the NEP project) or continue on its path towards communism separately from the 
rest of the world (the solution eventually adopted by Stalin)? In the latter approach 
socialism was no longer tied to the messianic idea of global transformation, of which the 
October Revolution in Russia would only be the triggering event, but rather began to define 
the positivity of the new Soviet state. For this state to maintain itself in the capitalist 
environment socialism had to cease to be a rallying cry for a messianic revolution and 
become a really existing form of order.34 This constellation permits us to understand the full 
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 implications of the much-maligned concept of ‘real socialism’, which refers precisely to the 
form of social order instituted in the USSR under Stalin and by Stalinist regimes in the post-
World War II Eastern Europe. Insofar as by the late 1920s ‘socialism in one country’ became 
not merely a debatable doctrinal point but an empirical fact, it could only be sustained by 
converting the passion for the messianic transcendence of all natural orders into the real 
existence of an immanent positive order as ‘second nature’. 
 
As a result of this conversion in the mid-1920s the messianic understanding of socialism 
gives way to what we may call the katechontic logic. The concept of the katechon that first 
appears in St Paul’s Second Letter to the Thessalonians refers to the restraining or delaying 
force that prevents both the coming of the Antichrist and the advent of parousia that is to 
follow it.35 The katechon does not lead a society towards redemption, but rather defers both 
 
redemption and catastrophe by instituting the reign of the ‘lesser evil’.36 The doctrine of 
socialism in one country exemplified this katechontic logic by promising to sustain the new 
socialist state in the hostile capitalist environment but only at the price of deferring and 
indeed restraining the parousia of world revolution. 
 
While this katechontic principle arguably characterizes all structures of constituted authority 
 
from the Roman Empire onwards,
37
 in the case of the Stalinist USSR it was characterized by 
a nuance that, as we shall demonstrate below, eventually undermined its operation. The 
Soviet regime did not simply face the problem of maintaining order in adverse 
circumstances but rather the problem of the institution of new order as a positive, lived 
reality – a ‘real socialism’ as a form of life, as opposed to the messianic goal of rendering 
inoperative all positive forms of life. The revolutionary ideal of the transcendence of nature 
is to be forced within the immanence of the natural order of things so that socialism would 
 
15 
be endowed with a real existence. The messianic ideocracy thus becomes a bio-cracy but 
not, as in the Nazi case, by making the immanence of life in the biological sense the 
supreme idea of the regime but rather by insisting on the need to translate the supreme 
idea of socialism into the immanence of life. By making socialism biopolitical the katechon 
also makes it real. 
 
Yet, this is where things become complicated. The forcing of revolutionary transcendence 
within the objective immanence of social reality can only take the form of the negation of 
the very reality that must be reconstructed as socialist. As long as transcendence is thought 
in cultural terms of learning and indoctrination, it maintains a distance from the lives that 
are to be transformed in it and which are retained as immanent supports for the emergence 
of new political subjects. If this distance is abolished in the biopolitical conversion of the 
messianic ideocracy, the life that is to be made socialist and the life, whose current natural 
order is to be transcended, coincide without remainder. The ultimate paradox of socialist 
biopolitics is that the combination of the immanentism inherent in any biopolitical project 
and the orientation towards transcendence that defines the communist revolution 
necessarily leads to the immanent negation of the very reality that is to be made socialist.  
 
 
 
 
Immunization and Biopolitical Violence 
 
 
We are now in the position to address the question of the violent character of Soviet 
biopolitics through a systematic comparison of the Stalinist case with liberal and Nazi 
modes of biopolitics. While Stalinist state violence is certainly extreme in comparison with 
any known case of liberal biopolitics, we ought not to forget that critical studies in the 
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 Foucauldian tradition have long emphasized the link between biopolitics and violence in 
liberal contexts. Despite the naturalist episteme at the heart of liberal biopolitics, liberal 
policies of laissez-faire were never merely a passive abandonment of an aboriginal reality to 
its own devices, but rather featured elaborate interventionist measures that sought to 
secure ‘natural liberty’ by taking necessary measures to correct its perversions. This 
‘corrective’ aspect points to what Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess have respectively termed 
 
the ‘illiberality of liberalism’ and the ‘liberal government of unfreedom’.38 According to these 
authors, liberal government historically identified within the ‘natural’ realm of the social 
manifold categories of the population, whose properties or acts were ‘contrary to nature’ and 
had to be rectified through governmental intervention, from the confi nement of 
madmen to the correction of juvenile delinquents.39 
 
 
The orientation of liberal biopolitics towards security permits us to understand these 
corrective interventions in terms of Esposito’s notion of immunity, which generalizes the 
 
above-discussed concept of the katechon.40 The logic of immunization seeks to protect the 
political community from its constituent negativity by mobilizing this very negativity as an 
instrument of defense: ‘Just as in the medical practice of vaccinating the individual body, so 
the immunization of the political body functions similarly, introducing within it a fragment 
of the same pathogen from which it wants to protect itself, by blocking and contradicting  
 
natural development.’41 In a similar manner, liberalism violates its own limits so as to secure the 
operation of the system of natural liberty against the threat that this liberty poses to itself. 
Insofar as natural liberty must logically presuppose the liberty of being contrary to nature and is 
thus a permanent danger to itself, liberal government must protect society from the threat of 
‘denaturation’ that is inherent in it by practicing a measure of this very  
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 denaturation itself in the governmental intervention of the kind that it generally frowns  
 
upon.42 
 
 
The critique of liberal government that exposes its perpetual transgression of its own limits 
in these projects of immunitary re-naturalization of the social realm attunes us to the 
implausibility of any simplistic contrast between liberalism and totalitarianism as between 
‘limited’ and ‘unlimited’ government. Nonetheless, it would be equally implausible to efface 
all differences between e.g. liberal and Stalinist biopolitics on the grounds that liberalism 
does not respect its own limits. It would be more fruitful to focus on the specific role that 
this limit of ‘natural liberty’, however frequently violated, plays in liberal biopolitics. In the 
simplest of terms, the reality that liberal biopolitics takes as its object must remain what it 
is. The violent interventions of liberal biopolitics must thus be limited to the cases when the  
object of biopolitical rule does not (appear to) follow its own natural law. Of course, we 
should not complacently conclude from this that violent interventionism somehow becomes 
exceptional or peripheral to liberalism: since the naturality of the liberal order is itself an 
artifice, in principle anything can be found to violate it (from masturbating children to 
hysterical mothers, from welfare recipients to profligate governments). Anything but not 
everything - as long as there is at least something in the existing reality that government 
may graft itself onto as its foundation, the limit to the biopolitical negation of the given 
forms of life remains there. 
 
Let us now briefly consider the question of negation in Nazi biopolitics, which at least 
matched its ‘totalitarian’ twin in the scope and intensity of lethal violence. Without 
abandoning the naturalist ontology of life characteristic of liberalism, Nazism defines these 
naturalist presuppositions in racial terms. While classical liberalism claimed to protect the 
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 natural reality of economic exchange from corruption by governmental interference, Nazism 
claimed to protect the natural reality of the Aryan race from contamination by 
heterogeneous and alien elements in the German society. Yet, precisely because the very 
naturality of this figure of race is as fictitious and artificial as liberal liberty, the elements it 
needs protection from multiply infinitely and ultimately threaten to engulf the German 
society as a whole. The violent paroxysms of Nazi biopolitics thus exemplify the most 
extreme form of Esposito’s paradox of immunity, whereby the desire to protect society 
from the negativity internal to it leads to the introjection of secondary negativity to such an 
extent that it ultimately threatens the society’s survival. 
 
Immunity negates the power of negation, at least what it considers as such. 
Yet it is precisely because of this that immunity continues to speak the 
language of the negative, which it would like to annul: in order to avoid a 
potential evil it produces the real one; it substitutes an excess with a defect, a 
fullness with an emptiness, a plus with a minus, negating what it affirms and in 
so doing affirming nothing other than its negation.43 
 
 
The extremity of the Nazi genocide is not a perversion of the idea of immunization, but 
rather its logical conclusion, whereby the immunitary logic folds back on itself in an auto-
immune manner: ‘[Nazism] strengthened its own immunitary apparatus to the point of 
remaining victim to it. The only way for an individual or collective organism to save itself  
definitely from the risk of death is to die.’
44
 The key difference of Nazism from liberal forms 
of biopolitics consists in its construction of human nature in strictly biological terms, which 
renders the immunitary project no longer metaphorical but horrendously literal. Yet, this 
shift from the metaphorical to the literal and from mediation to the immediate still takes  
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 place within the coordinates of the more general katechontic logic of immunization that 
Nazism shares with liberalism. 
 
Thus, both liberalism and Nazism deployed violent and ultimately thanatopolitical practices as 
‘secondary’ immunizing means of combating the negativity internal to and inherent in the social 
body, supplementing the ostensibly primary task of the positive augmentation of the vital 
capacities of respectively the economy and the race in accordance with their immanent natural 
laws. Only to the extent that these laws were held to be broken or endangered did the 
biopolitical rationality authorize governmental interventions into this positive domain. In 
liberalism this authorization historically tended to take place as a matter of an exception on  
specific occasions with regard to specific objects, even though the experience of colonial  
 
government exemplifies the way the exception so easily turns into a rule.45 On the contrary, 
for Nazism this disposition became the norm from the outset, authorizing manifold 
governmental interventions not only against select categories of the population deemed 
biologically other and dangerous but also multifarious interventions into the living  
substance of the privileged race itself.46 Yet, even in the latter case, the fundamental logic 
of biopolitical reason remains immunitary and immanentist. In contrast, the thanatopolitical 
conversion of Stalinist biopolitics may not be explained by the radicalization of the paradox 
of immunity, since it is precisely the immunitary function that is renounced in the idea of 
the forcing of transcendence into immanence. In the following section we shall consider an 
empirical example of this renunciation. 
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The Great Break: The Forcing of the Socialist Ideal 
 
 
In contrast to the logic of immunization in both its moderate and extreme forms, the 
biopolitical rationality of Stalinism did not seek to promote, optimize, augment or even 
correct what is (however fictitious and artificial this given object ultimately turns out to be) 
but rather to make be (to create as positive reality that which is for now present in the 
transcendent form of the revolutionary ideal). In the Stalinist biopolitical problematization 
the immanent reality of social life that liberalism and Nazism valorized as natural in their 
own distinct ways is devalued in its positive content by the very ideal which is to replace it. 
If the existing reality of private property, individualism, religion, etc. is from the outset 
construed as obsolete and dying, then it can never pose a positive limit but only a purely 
negative obstacle to socialist transformation. The only thing that socialism promises this 
dying reality is the actualization of its death. It is thus no coincidence that its most sustained 
project bore the name of the Great Break (veliky perelom). The period of the Great Break 
(1928-1932) is usually addressed in terms of three radical transformations: collectivization, 
industrialization and the Cultural Revolution. In these three projects the denigrated 
immanence of social reality of semi-capitalist agriculture, underdeveloped industry and the 
uncultured population were to be replaced by new forms of life: socialized (or nationalized) 
agriculture, rapid development of heavy industry, the development of proletarian culture 
and the rise of socialist intelligentsia. 
 
The forced industrialization, implemented during the first two five-year plans, led to 
significant increases in coal and iron ore production, as well as the establishment, frequently 
from scratch, of major new industrial complexes, e.g. Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, as well as 
new machinery, tractor and automobile plants. The rapid industrial development, 
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 particularly in heavy industry, came at the price of extreme social dislocations and led to the 
 
marked decrease in workers’ living and working standards.47 The workers’ real incomes fell 
during the early 1930s and their working conditions became poorer and more hazardous, 
particularly in newly constructed complexes, where housing and hygienic conditions were at 
best rudimentary. The workers were also subjected to much more stringent production 
norms and harsher disciplinary measures, starting with the 1932 amendments to the Labour 
Code that made it possible to fire workers for one day’s absence, intensifying with the 1938 
introduction of compulsory ‘labour books’ and culminating with the 1940 legislation 
 
introducing criminal penalties for quitting a job or being late for work.48 During the terror of 
1936-1938, even minor violations of work discipline would lead to the accusation of 
‘wrecking’, immediately associated with political opposition and espionage and leading to 
 
long camp terms or even execution.
49
 The camp system itself played not merely a punitive 
but also an active productive role in the industrialization process, since major development 
projects, most notably the White Sea-Baltic Sea and Moscow-Volga Canals, the Baikal-Amur 
 
railway, etc., relied on the use of the forced labour of camp inmates.
50 
 
 
The Cultural Revolution was a multifarious process of the overcoming of the pre-
revolutionary ‘cultural backwardness’ through the development of universal school 
education and health care, literacy campaigns for adults, higher education for workers and 
the formation of the proletarian intelligentsia to replace the distrusted yet necessary 
‘bourgeois specialists’.51 The cultural campaigns of this period sought to revive the militant 
spirit of the October revolution and the Civil War and targeted all forms of non-
revolutionary culture, both traditional and bourgeois; attempting their eradication in favour 
of variably understood proletarian culture. Campaigns led by the Komsomol and rank-and- 
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 file party activists united in professional and artistic associations of the militant left targeted 
‘alien class influences, bourgeois degeneration, petty-bourgeois wavering and blunting of 
 
revolutionary vigilance in the face of the more cultured class enemy'.52 In contrast to the 
utopian experimentation of the 1920s that had similar goals, the Revolution of 1928-1932 
took the explicitly antagonistic form of ‘class war on the cultural front’, combining violent 
 
militant actions from below with party leadership from above.53 The ‘warlike’ character of the 
Cultural Revolution took the form of criminal prosecution of professional and academic elites 
(the Shakhty Trial of 1928, the Industrial Party Trial of 1930, the Academics ’ Trial of 1931), the 
expulsion of students of non-proletarian backgrounds from schools and universities, censorship 
and witch-hunts in sciences and arts, etc. The biopolitical orientation of this process is evident 
from the following claim: ‘we have to drive out all trace of liberal culture-mongering from 
cultural work and conduct it as proletarian struggle for the 
 
real creation of a new culture.’
54
 ‘New culture’ could only attain the status of a ‘real 
creation’, if old culture, be it traditional peasant ways of life, the decadent ‘jazz age’ lifestyle 
of the NEP-men, the bohemian modernism of the urban intelligentsia or the technicis t 
apoliticism of the specialists, could be de-created, sometimes in a painfully literal way. 
 
Of course, the greatest ‘break’ was achieved in the process of collectivization, which sought 
to and largely succeeded in radically transforming the form of life of over 80% of the 
population, from de facto private farming to forced employment in socialized or 
nationalized farms. While private farming was routinely denounced by the Bolsheviks on 
ideological grounds since before the Revolution, collectivization remained on the level of 
utopian experimentation, less than 1% of farm land having been collectivized in any way by 
1928. In contrast, after one year of the Stalinist all-out drive for collectivization, the figure 
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rose to over 60%, exceeding even the official designs of the Five-Year Plan.55 The 
mobilization of the peasant population for forced labour in state-organized and state-
controlled structures not only swept away century-old communal traditions and ways of life 
in pre-revolutionary peasant Russia, but subjected millions of peasants to persecution, 
arrest, camp confinement, forced resettlement and separation of families. Violently 
crushing numerous attempts at resistance, the regime engaged in what amounted to the 
second Civil War, which was not over after the completion of the collectivization in 1932 but 
flared up again in the form of top-down state terror of 1937, when the infamous ‘mass 
operations’ targeted former kulaks and village priests as well as their family members. The 
most horrendous aspect of this civil war was the famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukraine, North 
Caucasus, Kazakhstan and other areas of the USSR, which claimed the lives of at least five 
million people and is presently interpreted either as a consequence of the disastrous 
economic policies of collectivization or as an intentional act of genocide on the part of the 
regime.
56 
 
 
However different in scope and effects, these three aspects of the ‘second revolution’ 
demonstrate the biopolitical character of the Great Break as the project of converting the 
transcendent ideals of the communist ideology into the lived reality of a socialist society as 
the first stage in the construction of communism. The empirical record of violence involved 
in this project illustrates the logic at heart in the very project of the biopolitical production 
of social immanence as opposed to the biopolitical regulation of anterior reality. For the 
new socialist reality to emerge, the old society must cease to exist, sometimes only in terms 
of status (university professors reduced to unemployment and poverty) and sometimes in 
the brutely physical sense (millions of victims of repression, resettlement and starvation).  
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 Socialist biopolitics is from the outset characterized by the presupposition of the violent 
forcing of something new into a domain radically heterogeneous to it and the forcing out of 
all that conflicts with the newly produced reality. Contrary to both liberal and Nazi 
biopolitics that, at least in principle, sought to capture and govern life according to its own 
immanent rationality, Soviet biopolitics was hostile to the very life it sought to govern. 
 
 
 
 
Anti-Immunity: From Katechon to Accelerator 
 
 
This hostility of Soviet biopolitics to the given reality produces an uncanny reversal of the 
immunitary logic that, according to Esposito, holds true for both liberalism and Nazism. 
These two immanentist varieties of biopolitics sought to protect life from its immanent 
‘natural’ negativity by the injection of secondary, ‘artificial’ negativity that is supposed to 
save life from itself. This secondary negativity might at times slip out of control and 
endanger the survival of life itself, yet these paroxysms would be an indication of biopolitics 
going wrong. The massive violence of liberal regimes in colonial territories could be grasped 
as the betrayal of liberalism from within the liberal episteme, while Hitler’s 1945 Demolition 
Order that resigned the German population itself to death through the destruction of vital 
infrastructure was clearly a symptom of the ultimate failure of Nazism. While these 
paroxysms of immunitary biopolitics are indeed inherent in it as potentialities for thanato-
political conversion, they are only accessible within these problematizations as paroxysmal, 
excessive and perverse. The naturalist presuppositions of the immunitary logic serve both to 
authorize corrective interventions and to condemn them when things get out of hand. 
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 In the case of Stalinism, biopolitical violence follows an entirely different logic.  Insofar as 
Stalinism abrogated the naturalist presuppositions defining both liberalism and Nazism, the 
negativity of revolutionary transcendence is introjected into the immanence of social life 
not as a means of its protection but directly as a means of its overcoming, negation, and 
ultimately destruction. Thus, the violence that seems counterintuitive in immunitary 
biopolitics is not at all paradoxical in the Soviet case. After all, the Internationale promised 
that the revolution would ‘wipe the slate clean’ so that the ‘world would change its 
foundation’ and ‘whoever was nothing would become everything’. There is then nothing 
surprising about the hostility of the radical revolutionary project to life as it is, to the 
immanence of given forms of life that have attained a quasi-natural status or to ‘mere life’ 
understood as the confinement of humanity in its nature. Moreover, the model for this 
‘change of foundation’ had already been established by the political revolution of 1917, in 
which ‘nothing’ became ‘everything’ (and conversely) in symbolic terms of positive and 
negative discrimination, abolition of ranks and titles, lustration, etc. Yet, as soon as we go 
beyond the mere juridico-political reversal and venture to produce socialism as a positive 
form of life, the logic of the Internationale gets rather more ominous. How can we change 
the foundation of the world in lived reality? What is the ‘clean slate’ if it is no longer a 
metaphor? Translated into biopolitical terms, the hostility to the existing world means that 
for nothing to become everything, something in the world would have to become nothing, 
i.e. cease to exist. 
 
As we have argued above, immunitary biopolitics seeks to protect the immanence of life 
from the dangers inherent in it and mobilizes some of these dangers as pathogens to be 
administered for the purposes of protection: ‘[immunity] reproduces in a controlled form 
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exactly what it is meant to protect us from.’57 Thus, the negativity that this mode of 
biopolitics finds in the immanence of life is never completely effaced but on the contrary 
becomes part of the apparatus of protection: ‘the negative not only survives its cure, it 
constitutes the condition of effectiveness. It is as if it were doubled into two halves, one of 
which is required for the containment of the other: the lesser of two evils is intended to 
block the greater evil, but in the same language.’ (ibid.) This is why immunitary biopolitics is 
constitutively anti-utopian: insofar as protection may only be negative and the negativity 
that demands protection from is ineradicable, all that can be attained is always the lesser 
 
evil but never the Good as such.58 
 
 
Thus, in full accordance with the katechontic principle immunitary biopolitics fights evil with 
evil and in this manner infinitely defers the appearance of the Good. In contrast, what is at 
stake in socialist biopolitics is not the protection of reality with all its constituent negativity 
but rather its transformation that forces this negativity out and the revolutionary ideal in. 
The transcendent idea of communist revolution is precisely the idea of the Good that is to 
be actualized within the domain of immanence through the negation of the forms of life 
that presently characterize it. Insofar as it is not valorized as a ‘system of natural liberty’ or a 
Volksgemeinschaft, but rather devalued in terms of the communist doctrine, anterior social  
reality is not worthy of protection, even negatively. While it certainly promises a ‘new life’, 
socialist biopolitics does not promise it to the ‘old life’ and its representatives, who are 
instead wholly exposed to the force of transcendence that takes the empirical form of 
existential negation. With immunitary protection withdrawn from the existing forms of life, 
they end up subject to all possible forms of negative intervention: confiscation of property, 
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 forced resettlement, camp confinement, organized starvation and, ultimately, ‘liquidation’ 
either ‘as a class’ (1928-32) or as ‘enemies of the people’ (1936-1938). 
 
As the immunitary logic is reversed in favour of the full-blown forcing of transcendence of 
the Good into the immanence of life, the katechontic principle also ends up inverted in 
favour of its apparent opposite, namely eschatological apocalypticism that awaits and 
welcomes the Antichrist as the sign of the imminent parousia.
59
 Carl Schmitt termed this 
 
apocalyptic figure the ‘accelerator’ (Beschleuniger).
60
 The accelerator throws katechontic 
caution to the winds, yet not in order to destroy the constituted order in the hope for the 
Messianic Kingdom but rather to fortify this order by directly and immediately introjecting it 
with the good that the messianic idea may only promise and tease us with. This introjection 
cannot but take the form of the negative: ‘that which is not’ attains being in the world by 
rendering inexistent that which is. Moreover, because the introjected negative is not even 
perceived as negative but rather as the Good, there is no need to limit its dosage, hence the 
autocritical disposition of avoiding ‘governing too much’, so characteristic of liberalism, does 
not even arise in the case of Stalinism, which explicitly renounced all formal limits to the 
exercise of power. Instead, the entire apparatus of government is reoriented from the 
‘conservative’ task of securing, stabilizing and restraining towards the acceleration, 
catalyzation and forcing of its transcendent ideals into social immanence. 
 
In the studies of the Russian Revolution, the theme of apocalypticism usually arises in the 
 
context of the pre- and immediately post-revolutionary politics of the Bolshevik Party,
61
 
committed to revolution on the world scale and viewing Russia as the springboard for the 
wider revolutionary process, which, as every springboard, could well be sacrificed so that 
the world revolution could succeed. In contrast, the Stalinist doctrine of socialism in one 
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 country allegedly marked the abandonment of these eschatological illusions in favour of a 
more realistic and pragmatic course of fortifying the socialist system within the USSR in a 
katechontic fashion. Nonetheless, this interpretation, which has become ever more 
influential in the Putin period, when Stalin is increasingly recast as a non- or meta- 
ideological ‘authoritarian modernizer’,62 completely ignores the Great Break of 1928-1932 
and its horrendous social dislocations, which simply cannot be explained in terms of realistic 
and pragmatic policy designs. While the debates about the socioeconomic consequences of  
 
collectivization and industrialization show no signs of abating,63 it is clear that the shift from 
NEP to the Great Break was not primarily motivated by economic calculations but rather by 
political considerations, which continued to drive this ‘second revolution’ forward despite 
massive social resistance and human cost. The merely katechontic tasks of securing and 
stabilizing the Soviet state evidently did not call for the civil war against the peasantry, 
which itself created a genuine security threat in 1930-1932 and caused enormous instability 
in rural areas, or the shock industrialization, which was disorganized and wasteful to an 
 
extreme degree.64 The Great Break simply makes no sense from the perspective on 
Stalinism as a conservative-katechontic project that abandons the early Bolshevik 
apocalypticism that is usually associated with Stalin’s arch-enemy Trotsky. Instead, it can 
only be grasped as the intensification of this very apocalypticism through the actual forcing 
of revolutionary transcendence into social immanence, notwithstanding its economic and 
human costs, which were written off along with the old forms of life that were doomed to 
disappearance in the socialist world. 
 
While the paradox of immunization consists in the fact that every attempt to protect social 
reality against itself must make use of the very thing that endangers it, the paradox of 
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 Stalinist biopolitics consists in the fact that its complete realization would coincide with the 
complete annihilation of the lived reality to which it applies itself. If the Great Break were to 
succeed fully, the Soviet society would be completely broken. As long as the domain of life 
that is the object of biopolitical government is not perceived as natural, sui generis and 
endowed with its own rationality, but rather a priori devalued as the degraded, obsolete 
and already ‘dying’ remnant of the past to be transcended by a new vision of the Good that 
has no correlate in this reality, the production of the new is only conceivable as the negation 
that transforms the dying into the dead and only in this manner clears the space for the new 
life. In the words of Stalin’s close ally Lazar Kaganovich, the Great Break consists in the 
‘radical destruction of all socio-economic relations, accompanied by a technical revolution, 
and not the other way round.’65 
 
 
From this perspective, the paradigm of the Soviet biopolitical space was indeed the Gulag 
camp, in which the inmates were simultaneously stripped of their positive forms of life (as 
peasants, professors, priests, etc.) and subjected to the forced labour for the construction 
of the new socialist reality, including their own identities as ‘new Soviet persons’. 
Agamben’s famous thesis about the camp as the ‘biopolitical nomos of the modern’ finds its 
 
confirmation at the site that is not commonly associated with Western modernity.66 While 
labour and concentration camps were certainly not a Bolshevik or even a Russian invention, 
the camp serves as a better paradigm of specifically socialist biopolitics, insofar as it 
epitomizes the devaluation of given forms of life that remains peripheral in both liberal and 
 
Nazi versions of biopolitics.67 While the camps established by the Spanish in Cuba or the 
British in South Africa and the Nazi concentration camps were clearly sites of the state of 
exception (in relation to a well-defined norm in liberal regimes or gradually eclipsing the 
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norm itself in the Nazi case),68 the Soviet camp of the Great Break was, strictly speaking, the 
paradigm of the norm itself rather than an exception in any sense of the word. This is why 
the Gulag was never concealed by the regime until the period of the Great Purges but, on 
the contrary, was publicized incessantly as the key site of the ‘reforging’ of human beings 
into ‘new Soviet persons’. 
 
The History of the Construction of the White Sea–Baltic Canal, the infamous volume 
produced by a brigade of leading Soviet writers and artists headed by Gorky in 1934, could 
not have appeared in liberal or Nazi regimes, which might have considered their camps their 
‘dirty secrets’, a ‘necessary evil’, but never as the paradigm of socioeconomic policy as such. 
Yet, thus is precisely what Gorky, Shklovsky, Rodchenko and other key figures of Soviet art 
and literature ventured in their glorification of camp labour in the construction of the 
 
canal.69 The plot of the book that would serve as a foundation for the socialist realist 
doctrine emphasizes the transformation of class enemies, particularly kulaks and anti -Soviet 
saboteurs, into the heroes of socialist construction. While at the beginning of their terms 
the inmates are degraded as ‘all the pus that the country had strained off’, at the end of the 
construction they are presented as ‘amazing builders’, thoroughly rehabilitated and 
transformed by labour.70 Comparing the White Sea camps with ‘bourgeois prisons and 
camps’, allegedly characterized by lawlessness and brute violence for solely punitive 
purposes, the authors both moralize and aesthetize the Soviet camp as the site of reforging, 
a positive, pedagogical transformation of the subject: 
 
[The] entire social pedagogy in the camps has grown out of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, out of the laws of the socialist system. All of this complex, 
subtle and ramified system in fact consists of a single powerful thesis: in the 
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 camps we force people incapable of independently re-educating themselves to 
live the Soviet life, we push them until such time that they begin to do this 
voluntarily. Yes, we force them by all means to do what millions of people in 
our country do by goodwill, experiencing happiness and joy.71 
 
 
In this manner, the biopolitical violence of the camps is effaced both by the devaluation of 
the anterior lives of the inmates as ‘criminal’ that legitimizes the use of force and the 
explicit linkage of the camps to the Soviet system at large, whereby whatever takes place in 
the camps and outside them is ultimately the same process of ‘learning to live the Soviet 
life’. If liberal or Nazi camps are genuinely different from the rest of society and ending up in 
one of them certainly entailed a drastic change in one’s way of life, then the Soviet society 
during the Great Break must be grasped as simply a zero-degree camp, in which the very 
same process of reforging unfolds with a lesser intensity, milder violence or looser control. 
The analogy between the camp and the society at large was fortified in the June 1934 
Decree that made any unauthorized attempt to leave the territory of the Soviet Union a 
criminal offense that could be punished by death penalty. While certainly exceptional in its 
violence and inhumanity, the Soviet camp of the late 1920s and the early 1930s was also the 
paradigm of the social norm. 
 
 
 
 
High Stalinism: The Negative Inflections of Soviet Biopolitics 
 
 
Yet, great as it was, the Great Break was never total and the extreme biopolitics of the 
Second Revolution did not achieve a total forcing of the transcendence of the socialist idea 
within social immanence, which would have entailed the total disappearance of anterior 
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 forms of life. Instead, the apocalypticism of the Second Revolution was interrupted in 1934 
with the partial reassertion of the katechontic logic. From 1934 to the end of the Stalinist 
era the biopolitical rationality of Soviet socialism was subjected to what we may call a 
negative inflection, an immanent mode of negation that leaves the negated object partly 
intact yet removes its force, effectiveness or significance. While the general task of 
transition towards communism through the construction and development of socialis m was 
never renounced by the Soviet regime until its demise, the modes of this transition no 
longer resembled the apocalyptic drive of the Great Break. Instead, the Stalinist biopolitical 
rationality was fractured into three forms, all of which added a further negative twist to the 
negation of social immanence in 1928-1932. 
 
The first of these forms has been known as the Great Retreat since the 1946 classic work by 
Nicholas Timasheff who observed a partial reversal in the policies of the construction of  
socialism after 1934.72 This reversal took different forms in different areas: the restoration 
of economic incentives and disciplinary measures in the industry, the rehabilitation of 
‘bourgeois specialists’ and the restoration of ranks and titles, the downgrading of 
proletarian internationalism and the cultivation of Russian patriotism in school education 
and popular culture, the return to a pro-family and pro-natalist policy, etc. While the term 
‘retreat’ might be inappropriate, since these policies did not amount to an explicit 
abandonment of the socialist project, they nonetheless constitute a fundamental 
transformation of this project through a certain compromise with the given reality that 
tempers the sociocidal drive at the price of the divergence of Soviet socialism from its 
official concept, which became ever more pronounced after Stalin’s death. 
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 The second mode of negative inflection was partly intended to conceal this divergence. The 
doctrine of socialist realism, established in 1934 as the official canon of all Soviet art, 
posited the task of the artist as the ‘representation of Soviet reality in its revolutionary 
development’, i.e. in its becoming as opposed to its being. As long as the object of 
representation in socialist realism was the invisible essence of reality in its revolutionary 
becoming, this canon became thoroughly separated from reality as such, producing 
simulacra of socialist forms of life, including New Soviet Man, at the cost of the de-
realization and aesthetization of life itself. While the Great Retreat negated the purity of the 
socialist ideal in favour of a certain toleration of the messiness of the real, the strategy of 
socialist-realist simulacra served to de-realize the messy and unwieldy ‘real life’ through its 
saturation with aesthetic representations of the socialist ideal.
73 
 
The final negative inflection of socialist biopolitics is exemplified by the phenomenon of the 
Great Terror of 1936-1938. While, as we have seen, the Soviet regime never shunned 
recourse to state violence, the era of the Terror remains exceptional not merely in the scope 
and intensity of violence but also in its manifest lack of an instrumental objective, either 
ideological as in the Red Terror of the Civil War or biopolitical as in the Great Break. 74 It is 
notable that the Terror in its three main forms of party purges, mass operations against ex-
kulaks and national operations against diasporas, began in the aftermath of the passage of 
the 1936 Constitution, which proclaimed the completion of the process of socialist 
construction, the formal abolition of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and the cessation of 
 
class war.75 Paradoxically at first glance, it was the very claim for stabilization and 
pacification in the USSR that made possible the extreme escalation of the Terror. Since the 
enemy was no longer defined by its class identity, it became cast as the ‘enemy of the 
people’ as a whole, defined not merely in political but simultaneously in criminal and moral  
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terms as ‘fiends’, ‘pygmies’, ‘fascist lackeys’, ‘insects’, etc.76 Secondly, since the enemy was 
no longer visible, it could be found anywhere in the society. While the Great Break was 
characterized by an explicit antagonism between the state and the peasantry, the period of 
the Terror was marked by the disappearance of an identifiable agent of antagonism and the 
consequent dissemination of state violence throughout the society: where there once was 
the party and the kulaks, there now stood the people and their enemies, and one could 
never be sure which category one belonged to. 
 
If the biopolitical project of the Great Break marked a forcing of the transcendence of the 
ideal within the real immanence of social life, the Terror negated this violent forcing, yet not 
by the retreat from the negating action but rather by divorcing the process of negation from 
the transcendent ideal, making the annihilation of immanence itself wholly immanent. 
Whether it is interpreted in intentional or structural terms, the Terror was a purely negative 
response to the negativity at the heart of the Soviet biopolitical project and rather than 
overturn this negativity it augmented and intensified it. In this manner, it marked the final 
stage in the conversion of biopolitics into thanatopolitics. Disjointed from the transcendent 
ideal to be forced into social immanence, governmental violence itself becomes strictly 
immanent and the political system is transformed into a killing machine: the violent forcing 
of the ideal into the real ends in the sheer destruction of reality as such. 
 
What began as a quasi-messianic project of transcending the given forms of life in the triumph 
of socialism as a positive, lived reality thus ended up a combination of a retreat and 
compromise with these forms of life, covered up by the proliferation of simulacra of socialist 
forms of life and enforced by terror disseminated throughout the society. This combination 
defines High Stalinism as we know it and the subsequent development of Soviet socialism,  
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 including its ultimate demise, may be grasped in terms of its eventual disarticulation. Once 
the terror subsided after Stalin’s death and the simulacra of socialism grew worn out and 
ineffective during the stagnation era, all that remained of socialism by the late 1980s was 
the retreat from it as such. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Our reconstitution of the biopolitical rationality of Stalinism demonstrates that its extreme 
violence arises out of its aspiration for the transcendence of all things natural, which, 
moreover, takes place not on the level of ideas but, as it were, within nature itself, in the 
immanence of lived reality that must become transformed in accordance with the 
transcendent communist ideal. It is thus this explicit orientation towards the transcendence 
of nature within its immanence that separates Stalinism from the Western biopolitics 
defined by a naturalist ontology, particularly liberalism. 
 
Yet, the lesson of Stalinism goes beyond the vindication of liberalism as a perpetually self -
critical and self-limiting governmental rationality, especially since liberalism itself has not 
been alien to the ‘biopolitics of transcendence’ that seeks to produce forms of life that do 
not yet exist by negating the forms of life that are given. The paradoxes and paroxysms of 
regime change and post-war management that we observe in Afghanistan and Iraq today 
may be explained precisely by the impossibility to simply transfer the liberal rationalities of 
rule onto societies that were never structured and governed according to liberal principles 
and which are as distant from the liberal ideal as the Russian or Ukrainian villages in the 
1920s were from the Bolshevik visions of collectivized agriculture. While ideologically 
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 liberalism and Stalinism are strictly antithetical, the Stalinis t project of the construction of 
socialism in a non-socialist society and the global promotion of liberal capitalism in non-
liberal settings face the same problem of forcing the transcendence of their different ideals 
into the immanence of social orders heterogeneous to these ideals. 
 
Moreover, the story does not end here, since, as Foucauldian studies have demonstrated in 
various ways, contemporary versions of liberalism increasingly abandon their naturalist 
presuppositions also domestically in extending the operation of economic rationality 
throughout the entire society. While neoliberalism maintains and even intensifies the liberal 
valorization of economic rationality, it no longer subscribes to the naturalist ontology that 
located this rationality in the immanent ‘system of natural liberty’ but rather posits it as an 
artefact of civilization, produced in governmental practices that establish quasi -market 
 
forms of life in various spheres of the society.77 As a result of this ontological reversal, the 
natural liberty that once posed a limit to governmental intervention is reinscribed as an 
artefact of this very intervention, the privileged form of life to be produced through the 
negation of any already given forms. 
 
Yet, as a result of this reinscription, neoliberalism becomes formally indistinct from the 
mode of problematization that we encountered in Stalinism, which, after all, also sought to 
govern society in the name of (a different understanding of the) economy. It therefore faces 
the same problem of what is to be done with the given forms of life that are heterogeneous 
to the neoliberal economic rationality. It also frequently resorts to the same solution of the 
destruction of the immanent rationalities of ordering and management in various domains 
and the reconstitution of the domains in question as quasi-enterprises. If neoliberalism has 
been considerably less violent, both physically and metaphorically, in this enterprise than 
 
37 
 Stalinism was in during the Great Break, this is not because of its  immanent limitations, 
which it abandoned by shedding the ontological assumption of natural liberty, but due to 
the existence of democratic institutions and practices, which make possible the resistance, 
however weak or ineffective, to the colonization of a plurality of immanent forms of life by 
economic rationality. Whenever these democratic institutions are weakened, dismantled or 
simply absent, we ought not to be surprised to see neoliberal biopolitics venture to force its 
ideal into the immanence of the real and, recoiling from the resulting dislocations, produce 
its own versions of retreat, simulacrum and terror. 
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